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THE MORAL DIMENSIONS OF POLITICS. By Richard J. Regan, S.J. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 1986. Pp. x, 204. Cloth, 
$24.95; paper, $11.95. 
In The Moral Dimensions of Politics, Richard J. Regan1 "presents a 
broad overview of morals and politics from an Aristotelian-Thomistic 
perspective and relates that perspective to public policy" (p. v). The 
early chapters of the book paraphrase accepted interpretations of natu-
ral law principles developed by the thirteenth-century Roman Catho-
lic theologian Thomas Aquinas. The author briefly analyzes these 
principles in comparison with modern moral theories and with the 
political theories of Hobbes, Locke, Marx, and Rawls. The remainder 
of the book demonstrates the possible application of Thomistic natural 
law to current public policy issues, including abortion, welfare, con-
ventional and nuclear war, and insurgency and counterinsurgency. 
According to Professor Regan, the purpose of the book is to intro-
duce students and the general public to the Thomistic tradition of rea-
son and "the philosophical framework within which many, like the 
American Catholic bishops, formulate statements on [these issues]" 
(p. v). He suggests that The Moral Dimensions of Politics be used as a 
basic text in college courses or adult discussion groups concerned with 
politics, social justice, and morality. However, the book seems less an 
analysis of Thomistic doctrine in relation to contemporary political 
issues than a basic primer for nonscholars who wish to argue the Tho-
mist position. 
Regan begins his quick summary of the Thomistic doctrine by 
characterizing Aquinas's writings on natural law as a synthesis of Ar-
istotelian natural moral good and biblical moral law. Under this char-
acterization, when a person acts in accordance with the divine 
purposes for human life, he or she is following the natural law. Regan 
explains that the primary precepts of the natural law are self-evident 
to human reason and are accepted as truisms by all rational persons. 2 
Further, practical reason enables us to deduce secondary precepts, 
1. The author is Associate Professor of Political Science at Fordham University. His previ-
ous books include PRlV ATE CONSCIENCE AND PUBLIC LA w (1972), CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS 
(1967), and AMERICAN PLURALISM AND THE CATHOLIC CONSCIENCE (1963). He is editor of 
LAW AND JUSTICE. 
2. The precepts of Thomistic natural law are themselves ordered according to our natural 
inclinations. First, humans have a primary inclination toward the good of self-preservation, 
shared by all things. Through this inclination, we love everything that preserves human life. 
Second, humans have instincts, natural in all animals, that incline us toward specific ends, like 
marriage and proper child-rearing. Third, humans have a unique inclination toward good in 
accordance with our rational nature. Thus, we have a natural desire to know God, to avoid 
ignorance, and to live in a cooperative society. T. AQUINAS, SUMMA OF THEOLOGY I-II, q. 94, 
a. 2, in AN AQUINAS READER 357 (M. Clark ed. 1972). 
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which constitute moral norms for human actions. 3 These secondary 
precepts are not necessarily self-evident but are often more remote 
from the primary precepts. Our understanding of these secondary 
precepts is contingent on cultural and historical variables and on the 
complexity of the circumstances to which they are applied (pp. 24-25). 
When we are faced with a choice, our practical reason judges the mo-
rality of a particular option. This judgment is manifest to us through 
conscience (pp. 29-33). Regan has reduced Thomistic moral doctrine 
to a simple matter of following one's conscience in actions involving 
proximate secondary precepts, and in actions involving more remote 
precepts, following conscience tempered by cultural, social, and his-
torical experience. 
Based upon this cursory analysis, he critiques twentieth-century 
theories of existentialism4 and Catholic consequentialism (pp. 26-28). 
According to Regan, many modem Catholic thinkers5 subscribe to 
consequentialist theories that are contrary to Thomistic doctrine. 
These theories distinguish ontological good, that is, good that can be 
measured in objective reality, from moral good, which is normative 
and not relative to the consequences that result from actions. Under 
consequentialism, actions can be understood as moral only when they 
necessitate a choice between conflicting ontological goods. There are 
no universal moral norms governing human activities absent a relative 
balancing of nonmoral consequences. Regan summarily rejects these 
consequentialist theories solely because they are inconsistent with the 
propositions, central to Aquinas's thinking, that (i) practical reason 
allows humans to understand basic moral precepts without any argu-
ment, because human nature inclines toward moral goodness, and (ii) 
secondary moral precepts follow rationally from these primary 
precepts (p. 28). Regan's arguments against both existentialism and 
consequentialism rely on the Thomistic premise that all existence is 
structured according to a natural order of being which is supremely 
rational and immediately evident to human reason. It is just this 
premise that some contemporary thinkers, like consequentialists, re-
ject. 6 They cannot accept the medieval notion of a natural, normative 
scheme. Regan never considers how this proposition, which many 
3. See generally id. at 358-59. 
4. Pp. 14-15. Regan concludes that existentialists, while they strive to rise above nature, will 
never attain their goal so long as they reject the purpose and meaning inherent in human nature. 
Regan does not identify these existentialists, nor does he propose a definition of existentialism. 
See pp. 14-15. 
5. As examples, Regan cites Joseph Fuchs, S.J., Louis Janssens, Richard A. McCormick, 
S.J., and Bruno Schuller. P. 36 n.22. 
6. Regan's brief discussion of existentialism and Catholic consequentialism fails to consider 
the merits of alternative theories advanced by ethicists like Derek Parfit. Parfit argues for the 
development of a nonreligious, consequentialist moral philosophy based upon the idea of an am-
plified personal identity. See D. PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS (1984). 
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find antiquated and artificial, can nevertheless remain a self-evident 
truism. 
In similar fashion, Regan summarizes Aquinas's basic tenets of 
political order and justice, and then rejects the theories of Hobbes, 
Locke, Marx, and Rawls as inconsistent with Thomistic doctrine, 
without considering the possible value of these theorists' conclusions. 
He finds the theories of Hobbes and Locke "inadequate" (p. 62), in 
part because both ignore the essential Thomistic truth that "humans 
as rational persons naturally incline to cooperate with their fellows to 
achieve long-term common goals even at short-term costs to individu-
als" (p. 63). The collectivist doctrine of Marxism is also manifestly 
incorrect for Regan, since it equates human good with the equitable 
distribution of material benefits and disregards the higher, spiritual 
purpose for which society is organized (pp. 67-68). Regan thus refutes 
classical liberalism and classical Marxism by circular syllogism: Aqui-
nas's premises cannot be incorrect; liberalist and Marxist conclusions 
derive from premises that contradict Aquinas's; therefore, liberalism 
and Marxism cannot be valid. He questions the validity of John 
Rawls's A Theory of Justice with similar superficial analysis, allowing 
no consideration of the value of the theory's conclusions: 
Rawls's concept of practical reason is one of calculating how best to 
achieve subjectively desired benefits without any ability to relate those 
subjective benefits to an objective order of goods perfective of human 
nature. If one believes, however, that humans in fact naturally do incline 
to cooperate with their fellows, and that human reason is capable of un-
derstanding from that fact that humans should do so, Rawls's project is 
basically unnecessary. 7 
Regan's application of Thomistic principles to contemporary polit-
ical issues also seems self-defeating. Where these issues are factually 
complex, Regan's position does not lead to new insight. On the topic 
of wealth distribution, for instance, Regan argues that Thomists would 
reject classical-liberal and communist models in favor of some system 
of welfare capitalism tempered with Aristotelian moderation, which 
would promote optimal human development (pp. 120-34). His argu-
ment seems to assume that Thomistic doctrine is necessary to arrive at 
such a system. In reality, however, many states, whether they call 
themselves capitalist or communist, assume some responsibility for 
distributing wealth and for regulating the moderate and just use of 
property. Many economic policies, though they may achieve just re-
sults in terms of Regan's desired goals, no more reflect the Thomistic 
concept of human development than they reflect a belief in classical-
liberal or communist theories. 
7. P. 78. This interpretation of Rawls is incomplete and misleading. Rawls also proposes the 
recognition of "natural duties" that are owed to others by all individuals without regard to social 
or institutional relations. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 114-17 (1971). 
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With respect to military policy, Regan outlines and applies "just-
war" theory as developed by Aquinas and later theologians. 8 He at-
tempts an analysis of five potential strategies for the use of nuclear 
weapons in terms of this theory. His tentative conclusion is that the 
only nuclear strategy that may possibly satisfy the just-war criteria is 
one which targets only enemy military forces to a degree minimally 
sufficient to deter an aggression that would substantially threaten the 
sort of human freedom we enjoy in the West.9 As Regan admits, it is 
difficult (some may say impossible) to apply the criteria of proportion-
ality and just conduct to strategic and tactical nuclear warfare (p.171 ). 
He also runs into difficulty in the context of insurgency and 
counterinsurgency, where he loses ground in his debate with the con-
sequentialists. Regan's discussion of the justice of intervention in rev-
olutionary wars is handicapped, because he is unable to reach a 
conclusion about the morality of intervention without admitting the 
relevance of the factual context surrounding particular issues. The 
background of revolutionary struggle in Third-World nations is com-
plex and involves elaborate cultural and historical patterns. Military 
and political decisions in this field implicate moral precepts that are 
quite remote from those basic precepts to which all persons will sup-
posedly agree without argument. In Regan's characterization of 
Thomistic doctrine, the just-war principles require that counter-
revolutionary war be waged discriminately and proportionally, that is, 
that only the guilty among the enemy be targeted and that all destruc-
tion be proportional to the importance of the military objective. In the 
face of political complexity, the proper application of these principles 
could be debated endlessly. Regan indicates that in such situations a 
state may be persuaded to act justly more by pragmatic considerations 
than by moral sensibilities. Pragmatism could be the motivation 
where, for example, "[i]ndiscriminate and disproportional warfare 
would alienate the very public whose support or acquiescence is essen-
tial to military victory" (p. 194). If, as Regan suggests, popular favor 
or acquiescence may be our only indication that a war has been justly 
waged, then morality can in certain instances be measured on a conse-
quentialist scale. Regan has weakened his critique of consequentialism 
8. In order for a war to be just, it must meet six criteria: (1) the decision to wage the war is 
constitutional; (2) the war has a just cause; (3) it is waged with a right intention; ( 4) its cost in 
destruction and loss oflife is proportionate to the injustice addressed; (5) all peaceful alternatives 
have been exhausted; and (6) there is a reasonable expectation that the just cause will be vindi· 
cated. P. 149. In the conduct of war, defending nations are morally obliged to avoid harming 
those among the enemy who are innocent of participating in the unjust aggression. Regan cites 
the fire bombing of Dresden and the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as examples of 
unjust conduct of war in the midst of an otherwise just war. Pp. 155-56. 
9. See pp. 167-71. Presumably, no Soviet nuclear strategy can ever be just, so long as the 
Soviet political regime is founded upon a theory of human freedom which contradicts Thomistic 
principles of moral development. According to Aquinas, "pluralism is inherent in every rightly 
ordered political society." P. 41. The natural law imposes moral limits on human government. 
Political power must derive from a constitution that represents "the will of the people." P. 43. 
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by admitting that, with respect to highly involved, politically conten-
tious activity, the operation of natural law may sometimes be evi-
denced only by the conditions resulting from the activity. 
Indeed, it is questionable whether the general application of Tho-
mistic principles to the complex political issues of the modem world 
can lead to significant insights. The basic precepts of practical reason 
are only those that activate human conscience, and the more remote 
precepts are contingent on factual variables, subject to the pragmatic 
limitations of moderation, proportionality, and discrimination. The 
resolution of complex issues, such as the issue of proper wealth distri-
bution, will nearly always be pragmatic, occurring beyond the simple 
dictates of conscience. Therefore, Thomistic morality and real-world 
pragmatism will tend to converge within the crude arena of political 
resolution. · 
Regan's Thomistic analysis of morality may be more telling when 
applied to political issues that involve the primary precepts of natural 
law, since the correct moral choice on these issues should be self-evi-
dent to rational legislators. For instance, the decision to fund abor-
tions publicly is obviously immoral, according to Regan, because 
abortion violates the primary precept that inclines us naturally to love 
all things human, including the human fetus (p. 101). However, even 
on supposedly basic, natural law issues, like abortion, there is active 
debate. That is because natural law is a matter of belief. Its force as 
law derives from the preeminance of Thomistic divine law, so that 
agreement about the basic precepts requires a common creed. If we 
adopt Thomistic natural law as a legislative doctrine, allowing no law 
to violate basic precepts, we could quickly resolve the abortion debate. 
However, since Thomism is fundamentally a theology, enacting legis-
lation officially on the basis of Thomism would violate a different basic 
precept, the establishment clause of the Constitution. 
Regan wants to avoid the issue of the separation of church and 
state. He maintains that "[n]o appeal to religious authority or creed is 
necessary" (p. 103) and that "the Thomistic analysis and argument for 
natural law remains one accessible to human reason irrespective of the 
divine salvific design" (p. 14). However, while Thomistic natural law 
may be independent of ecclesiastical authority and of the idea of 
Christian salvation, it is inseparable from the theological doctrine that 
human reason comprehends the divine scheme established by the Cre-
ator and from a set of beliefs about the moral imperatives of divine 
law. 10 For Thomists, like Regan, the role of morality in the political 
10. Regan writes that persons who reject the natural law "vitiate God's plan." P. 13. He 
also states that "the things commanded are prescribed because God ordained the natural order 
which constitutes them good, and the things prohibited are forbidden because God ordained the 
order which constitutes them bad." P. 83. 
There have been natural law philosophers, such as Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), who have 
maintained that the universe is fundamentally rational and that the laws of nature can therefore 
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process is necessarily theological and paternalistic. Society should be 
organized to reflect the "objective order of goods perfective of human 
nature" (p. 92), which has been ordained by God's creative act as in-
terpreted by the Thomists. A function of the state is to develop the 
moral well-being of the community (p. 93). This state paternalism is 
anachronistic now that Christendom has declined and there is no 
longer a unity of government and the Catholic Church. It seems par-
ticularly out of place in a post-Enlightenment political regime like that 
of the United States, in which theological theories regarding moral 
development are constitutionally insulated from state authority. 11 
Many non-Christians will reject Regan's argument, since it is founded 
upon an acceptance of this Christian paternalism. 
If The Moral Dimensions of Politics is an attempt to validate Tho-
mistic moral principles and convince skeptics of the link between these 
principles and political decisionmaking, Regan has failed on both 
fronts. His refutation of opposing theories is simplistic and uncon-
vincing. He assumes without question the intuitional truth of Thomis-
tic premises and does not consider the merits of alternative 
conclusions. The application of practical reason to complex political 
issues will probably not solve those issues since in many of these cases 
the resolution reached will merely be pragmatic and will not vary sub-
stantively from a status quo achieved without resort to Thomistic doc-
trine. The Thomist concept that government is responsible for the 
moral perfection of citizens according to the divine law of the Creator 
is medieval and paternalistic, and many modem political thinkers will 
reject it as such. 
Most probably, Regan is not attempting to convince non-Thomists 
of the relevance and significance of natural law propositions, but is 
instead addressing those who are already predisposed to accept Tho-
mistic thought. His book is an articulation of the Thomistic doctrine 
meant to assist those among its proponents who would venture into 
the public debate. As Regan suggests, "Without some concept of a 
natural moral order, Christians risk having nothing of relevance to say 
in moral matters to the millions of people who are not Christians" (p. 
be understood by human reason without any notion of divine law. As Regan's discussion makes 
clear, Thomism, on the other hand, subordinates human law to the eternal law of the creative 
God. Seep. 83. See also AN AQUINAS READER, supra note 2, at 369-79, 384-87. 
11. It is significant that the original American colonies were established by members of Prot-
estant sects seeking freedom from state persecution. Regan notes that the Protestant theological 
position on ethics is "that human will is too debased to act in unambiguously moral ways, and 
human reason is too enfeebled to recognize moral norms clearly without the aid of divine revela-
tion." P. 6. If this characterization is accurate, Protestant theology must deny the relevance of 
Thomistic practical reason and the bulk of Regan's analysis. 
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6). Unfortunately, because of the weaknesses of Regan's analysis, his 
argument for a "natural moral order" runs the same risk. 
. - Steven G. Bradbury 
